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SEARCH WARRANTS AND SANITATION
INSPECTIONS-THE NEW LOOK IN
ENFORCEMENT*
By SIDNEY EDELMAN**
Two 1967 Supreme Court decisions brought the protections of
the fourth amendment to bear on administrative searches into both
private homes and commercial premises. These cases, Mr. Edelman
points out, require the federal and local governments to alter their
approach to housing, sanitation and safety inspections. The author
suggests that an understanding of the private rights guaranteed by
the Constitution is necessary to the development of legislation and
administrative procedures which will allow social programs for the
public health and welfare to be carried out without invading those
private rights. With this goal in mind, Mr. Edelman discusses the
legal problems surrounding the exclusionary rule, consent to a war-
rentless search, who may consent, standing to challenge seizure,
enforcement of warrants, and consent to warrantless searches as a
condition of the license. Mr. Edelman suggests that statutory author-
ization will be necessary at any governmental level to provide a
workable procedure for obtaining search warrants. The necessity of
describing particularly the things to be seized is not an insurmount-
able problem, according to Mr. Edelman. He asserts that a court can
constitutionally issue a warrant if the purpose of the search is stated.
He reasons that with this information a court can determine the
necessity of the search and verify its limits. To illustrate the proce-
dure used by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, one
set of forms developed for obtaining warrants is included in an
appendix to the article.
"It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little
wrong.... It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper
result by irregular or improper means."
- Miranda v. Arizona'1
INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Camara v. Municipal Court2 and See v. City of Seattle5 call
for a thorough reexamination and revision of the concepts and proce-
dures which have previously guided the conduct of housing, sanitation,
and safety inspection programs in this country.
*Presented at the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association,
Inc., at Miami, Florida, Housing and Health Session, Oct. 25, 1967. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and should not be understood as expressions
of any official position.
**Chief, Environmental Health Branch, Public Health Division, Office of the General
Counsel, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
2387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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The Camara case arose out of the refusal of Camara, the lessee
of the ground floor of an apartment building, to permit a housing
inspector access to a part of the leased premises used by Camara as a
personal residence. This residential use was alleged to be in violation
of the occupancy permit for the building. Camara was advised that
section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code authorized the entry
of housing inspectors into any building, structure, or premises in the
city, but he persisted in refusing the inspector access to his apartment
without a search warrant. Thereafter he was arrested and charged
under section 507 of the Code4 with refusing to permit a lawful
inspection. Contending that section 503 was contrary to the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, Camara sought a writ of prohibition in
a California superior court against his trial on the charge of violating
that section.
Upholding Camara's contention and overruling Frank v. Mary-
land,' Mr. Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, held that
administrative searches for housing violations are significant intru-
sions on the privacy and security of individuals - interests which are
protected by the fourth amendment' against arbitrary invasions by
government officials and enforceable against the states under the
fourteenth amendment.' The Court declared that "such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to
the individual . . . ."' This is true, Mr. Justice White noted, whether
discovery of a violation on the initial inspection leads to a criminal
conviction or results only in an administrative compliance order. In
the latter case, he pointed out, refusal to comply is a criminal offense,
with the fact of compliance verified by a second inspection, again
without a warrant, and the refusal to permit the inspection is itself
a crime.9
Having concluded that a search warrant was necessary to support
the inspection at issue, Mr. Justice White turned to the fourth amend-
ment requirement that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable
4 Under section 507, such refusal is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more
than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
5 359 U.S. 360 (1959). This case held that sanitation and housing inspections not
seeking evidence for criminal prosecution were not unreasonable searches within the
fourth amendment and did not require search warrants.
6 The fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
7 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
9 Id. at 531.
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cause." Recognizing that "the only effective way to seek universal
compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes
is through routine periodic inspections of all structures," 10 he declared
that the area inspection approach was a reasonable search of private
property within the meaning of the fourth amendment," and pro-
vided the following guidelines for the determination of "probable
cause" to issue a warrant:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal pro-
gram being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the
condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.'
2
The Court noted three significant reservations to its general
holding:
[1] [N]othing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspec-
tions, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld
in emergency situations. ... [2] [A]s a practical matter and in light
of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the
property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen
complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
entry. [3] Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does
not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local
policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by
force, to inspect.' 3
In See,'4 the owner of a locked warehouse refused to permit a
representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and
inspect the warehouse without a warrant. The intended inspection
was part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to compel compliance
with Seattle's Fire Code and was authorized by section 8.01.050 of
the Code. That section authorized entry into buildings and inspections
without a search warrant. See, who was convicted and given a
suspended fine of $100.00 for violation of the section, contended
that the warrantless inspection authorized by the Code would violate
his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court in this case also,
declared there was no justification for distinguishing between private
W Id. at 535-36.
11 Id. at 538.
121d.
13 Id. at 539-40. The opinion cites, with regard to emergency situations, North American
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of unwholesome
foods); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory smallpox
vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health
quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929) (summary
destruction of tubercular cattle).
14 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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houses and commercial premises insofar as the protection of the fourth
amendment was concerned, saying:
As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presump-
tively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The business-
man, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right
placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation
of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the
field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.15
The Court concluded that "administrative entry, without consent,
upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the
public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force
within the framework of a warrant procedure."' 6
This holding, like that in Camara, was hedged about by com-
ments and reservations:
(1) The Court, with respect to the timing of a warrant, stated:
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may
be issued only after access is refused; since surprise may often be a
crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the
reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will nec-
essarily vary with the nature of the regulation involved and may
differ from standards applicable to private homes.17
(2) The Court did not "imply that business premises may
not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private
homes .... "Is
(3) The Court did not question "such accepted regulatory
techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to
operating a business or marketing a product." 9
The teaching of these cases is that an entry upon and inspection
of private property - residential property or commercial property
not open to the public- by government officials without proper
consent is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the fourth
amendment and may not be enforced unless authorized by a valid
search warrant. ° Accordingly, the occupant may not be punished for
refusing to permit a warrantless inspection. The restriction against
Is Id. at 543.
16 Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
17 Id. at 545 n.6. This language would appear to limit the issuance of warrants in
advance of refusal to permit inspection of residential premises to two situations,
i.e., a citizen complaint or other satisfactory reason (an emergency?) for securing
immediate entry. Id. at 539-40.
18 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
19 Id.
2 Although not an issue in these cases, corporations are protected by the fourth
amendment against warrantless entries and inspections. "[T]he Fourth Amendment
has been held applicable to corporations notwithstanding their exclusion from the
privilege against self-incrimination.. " Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 205 (1946) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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entry on private commercial property would, of course, be applicable
to the portions of multi-family houses reserved by the landlord, e.g.,
boiler rooms.
CONSTITUTIONAL INSPECTIONS AND THE NEED FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE INGENUITY
Putting aside the problems relating to the development of
inspection criteria designed to meet the probable cause requirement of
the fourth amendment, as suggested by the Court, let us examine
some of the other legal problems not mentioned in the decisions
which will attend the administrative implementation of the Court's
holdings.
A. Availability of Warrants
At the very threshold of our consideration we are confronted
with the question: Is there an available procedure for obtaining a
search warrant to make an inspection?
In Camara, the brief on behalf of the government pointed out
that there was no specific provision in the San Francisco Code or in
the state law under which a search warrant for inspection of the
premises could have been obtained." This situation is a generally
prevailing one, since most state laws authorizing the issuance of
search warrants are patterned on the federal authority, which is lim-
ited to searches for fruits of crime, instrumentalities, and certain
contraband.2 Congress has never authorized the issuance of search
warrants for the seizure of mere evidence of crime, although the
Supreme Court has recently indicated that a search warrant could be
authorized for such a purpose after fulfilling the probable cause and
particularity requirements of the fourth amendment and after the
intervention of "a neutral and detached magistrate." 23 Research has
disclosed only eight states which, subject to the probable cause and
specificity requirements of the fourth amendment, authorize the issu-
ance of search warrants to search for and seize property constituting
evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person com-
mitted a crime." Only one state - New Jersey - specifically author-
21 Brief for Appellee at 4.
22 Rule 41 (b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(b) Grounds for Issuance.
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any property
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) Possessed, controlled or designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 957.
23 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967).
24 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524 (West 1956) (only in case felony has been committed);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.07 '(1947);
MONT. REV. CODE ch. 95, § 705 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:11-16 (1964);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 792 (McKinney 1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 141.010 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4701 (1959).
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izes the issuance of a search warrant to enter and inspect multi-family
dwellings for housing code violations.2 5 Clear authorization to issue
inspection warrants (or equivalent court orders) under fourth amend-
ment safeguards is thus a matter of the highest priority and need.
In the light of the rulings in these cases, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare has taken the position that inspection
warrants may be issued under specific authorities for inspection pro-
vided in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and in the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act. A few of these warrants have already
been obtained, and one set of the forms developed for such purpose
is included in the appendix. Whether a similar approach is feasible
under state and local laws would, of course, depend on an evaluation
of the prevailing statutory situation.
B. The Exclusionary Rule
Lest there be any temptation to do business as usual on initial
inspections, one consequence of an illegal search which should be
noted here is that any seizure made during an illegal search would
itself be illegal, and if timely and appropriate objection is made, such
items may not be used or remain in evidence.26 This exclusionary
rule, flowing from the command of the fourth amendment imple-
mented by the fifth amendment, is applicable to the states under the
fourteenth amendment.2" The rule has traditionally barred from trial
physical tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result
of an unlawful invasion.28 But the policies underlying this rule do
not invite any distinction between tangible and intangible evidence
so that a verbal statement made during an illegal search has been
suppressed and testimony concerning objects illegally observed has
been excluded.29 Nor may conditions illegally observed be the basis
for subsequently swearing out a search warrant.30 The applicability
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:11-16 (1964).
2 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
27 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). As the Court declared in Ker v. California:
In Mapp v. Ohio, at 646-647, 657, we followed Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, imple-
mented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal
Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained
from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Fourth
Amendment.... This means, as we said in Mapp, that the Fourth Amend-
ment "is enforceable against them [the states) by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government," by the application of
the same constitutional standard prohibiting "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 367 U.S., at 655.
374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
28 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385'(1920).
29 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (involving seizure of conversation by
wiretapping) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (lst
Cir. 1955) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (involving seizure of con-
versation by electronic device).
30 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955).
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of this rule emphasizes the importance of establishing clearly that
consent has been obtained for a warrantless search based on consent.
C. Consent to Warrantless Search
With these considerations in mind, let us now examine the
question of consent to a warrantless search, a consent which is needed
under the fourth and fifth amendments to assure the legality of the
search as well as the availability of evidence so obtained. While the
Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments may be voluntarily waived,3 1 the cases
identify a gulf between acquiescence or submission and the consent
necessary to constitute a voluntary waiver. Where officers demand
admission to private premises in the name of the law or under color
of office, their subsequent explorations have been held searches within
the bar of the Constitution, even though the occupant opens the door
to admit them."2 Such entry, it has been said, is "granted in sub-
mission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional
waiver of a constitutional right." 
33
In short, the consent must be unequivocal and specific, freely and
intentionally given. When entry into a person's premises by officers
of the law not having a warrant is sought to be justified by that
person's consent, the applicable standard is a rigorous one, and the
Government has the burden of proving by clear and positive evidence
that such consent has been given.3 4
Evidence of consent may be oral or written, and experience in
the inspection field will show which is preferable. 5 Where a verbal
consent is relied on, some federal courts have held that nothing short
of specifically advising the person of his right to refuse a warrantless
31 Zapv. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
3 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
33 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
34 Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. United States,
307 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1962); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219
(9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
35 The Department of Justice Handbook on the Law of Search and Seizure recommends
that the consent be in writing and suggests the following form:
I, John Doe, know of my constitutional rights to refuse to allow a police
search of any part of my house at 711 Royalty Road, Alexandria, Va.
However, I have decided to allow Tom Smith and Bill Jones, members of
the Metropolitan Police, to search every part of my house. They have my
permission to take any letters, papers, materials, or other property they
want. I have decided to make this consent carefully, of my own free will,
and without being subject to threats or promises. I know that anything
discovered may be used against me in a criminal proceeding.
Jan. 22, 1967
Signed John Doe
Witness 1. Bob Janitor.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
52 (1967).
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search will meet the fourth amendment requirement of a knowing
waiver imposed to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may sur-
render their rights more readily than the shrewd."'
D. Who May Consent
The general rule is that immunity from unreasonable search and
seizure can be waived only by the person whose rights are otherwise
to be invaded or by someone known to have authority to make a
waiver of that right for the person to be affected in his absence, and
such authority cannot be implied or presumed. 7
Thus, the occupant of residential premises can give an effective
consent to a search of the apartment or room occupied by him. The
landlord or other proprietor of residential premises, hotels, or board-
ing houses cannot, however, give an effective consent to a search of
the apartment or room actually occupied by another person.3
A person having equal rights to the use or occupation of premises
may consent to a search, and evidence thus obtained may be used
against the other joint occupant even though the latter has not
consented.
3 9
The cases are in conflict as to whether a wife can give effective
consent as against her husband for a search and seizure of property
in the family living quarters. Thus it has been held that the constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable searches is a personal one
which neither the husband nor the wife can waive for the other.4
Other cases have held that where the wife is a joint owner of the
41premises, or is recognized as a joint occupant, her consent to a
search of family quarters is valid.4 2 The authority of the wife to give
36 United States v. Nickrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Contra, Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d
158 (1st Cir. 1967), which held a specific fourth amendment warning unnecessary in
the following factual situation:
[W~hen the accused is directly asked whether he objects to the search, there
must be at least some suggestion that his objection is significant, or that the
search waits on his consent. When this is combined with a warning of his
right to be silent, and his right to counsel, which would seem in the circum-
stances to put him on notice that he can refuse to cooperate, we think it fair
to infer that his purported consent is in fact voluntary.
Id, at 163-64.
37 Raine v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1924); United States v. Ruffner, 51
F.2d 579 (D. Md. 1931); Hayes v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 P. 232 (1927).
38 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
39 Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Sferas,
210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) ; People v. Hicks,
165 Cal. App. 2d 548, 331 P.2d 1003 (1958).
4 United States v. Rykowski, 267 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920); Simmons v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951); People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W.
797 (1928).
41 People v. Hambley, 4 I11. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
4 United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. Sergio,
21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) ; People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665
(1957) ; Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964) ; State v. Cairo, 74 R.I.
377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948).
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such consent is based, not upon any principle of agency, but upon her
own status, and extends only to that property or area of the premises
over which the wife normally exercises as much control as the
husband.43 Under this view, which reflects the growing trend, the
wife clearly may give authority for an inspection of living quarters
jointly occupied by herself and her husband.
In the case of consent for a search of business or industrial
premises, the cases appear to turn on the scope of the authority of the
employee whose consent is relied upon. Thus, courts have upheld
consent for a warrantless search given by an office manager,44 by the
corporation general manager entitled to 50 percent of the profits,45
and by the agent placed in charge of property.46 A clerk or similar
employee cannot give an effective consent in the absence of specific
authorization for the purpose.47
While a presumption of authority to give consent to a warrantless
search does not arise from the mere fact of employment, the courts
have found such authority where the search or inspection was directed
to matters which would usually arise in and be part of the duties of
employment. Managerial employees, whose duties include the over-
sight of business operations and compliance with legal requirements
would, therefore, probably be found authorized to grant an effective
consent to the inspection of business premises.
E. Standing to Challenge Seizure
Under section 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
only a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" has
standing to move for the exclusion or suppression of the property
seized. As illuminated by the Supreme Court, this rule reaches not
just the victims of the invasion (generally described as having an
interest in the premises such as ownership, a right to possession, or
the interest of a lessee) ; as stated in Jones v. United States,48 "anyone
legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its
legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed
to be used against him." 49 In Jeffers v. United States,50 the rule was
43 People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) ; State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii
622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962) ; Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964).
44 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 742 (1946).
"Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), modified on other grounds,
161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947).
48 Raine v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1924).
47 Lord v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963); United States v. Ruffner, 51 F.2d
579 (D. Md. 1931); Hays v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 P. 232 (1927).
4362 U.S. 257 (1960).
4Id. at 267.
50 187 F.2d 498, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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held to extend to the owner of property seized as the fruit of an
unlawful search even though the premises searched were not his and
he was not present at the time of the search.
California has adopted an even more liberal view on the exclu-
sion of evidence and holds that evidence obtained by virtue of an
unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible whether or not it was
obtained in violation of the particular defendant's constitutional
rights.5
Thus, where an attempt is made to use evidence obtained in an
unlawful search of a tenant's apartment against a landlord (e.g.,
defective wiring or plumbing), the landlord may, under the federal
rule, be able to suppress the evidence on the grounds that he owned
the property seized or, under the California rule, simply on the
grounds that the search and seizure was unlawful.
F. "'Particularly describing.., the things to be seized"
The fourth amendment requirement that a search warrant "par-
ticularly" describe "the things to be seized" may occasion some
difficulty for general housing and sanitation inspections which
extend from defective appliances, hazardous conditions, and cleanli-
ness to window screens, ratholes, and the number of electrical outlets
in a room. Such a broad-ranging inspection may require a thorough
search of every room in an apartment, or of the entire commercial
premises as well as closets, cupboards, storerooms, and related
accounts and records. But a warrant which is so broad that the appro-
priate limits of the inspection depend on the discretion of the investi-
gator and could not be verified by reference to the warrant itself
would obviously fall short of the fourth amendment requirement. As
the Court observed in Camara, in the absence of a warrant, the appel-
lant was unable "to verify ... the appropriate limits of the inspec-
tion." 52
While it could be argued that the fourth amendment requires
that the warrant must specify in detail every item to which the inspec-
tion will be directed, a reasonable middle ground, which will permit
the court issuing the warrant to determine its necessity as well as to
verify the limits of the search, would call for a statement of the
purpose of the search, e.g., inspection of the physical condition of
the premises, plumbing, electrical wiring and fixtures, and related
51 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). See also State v. Schaf-
fel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (1966), petition for certification for appeal
denied, 228 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1967), holding that while landlord had standing to
move for suppression of evidence obtained by warrantless inspection of tenant's apart-
ment, his rights were not infringed since tenant had consented.
52387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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conditions bearing on violations of sections of
the Housing Code and of sections of the
regulations issued thereunder. It may also be desirable to attach to
the warrant copies of the cited sections of the code.
G. Enforcement of War-rants
If the occupant of premises to be searched refuses to comply with
a warrant, how is the warrant to be enforced?
In See, the Court spoke of compelling entry "through prosecu-
tion or physical force within the framework of a warrant proce-
dure," " while in Camara, it indicated that force to compel entry into
residential premises was not contemplated by the requirement of a
warrant procedure.
54
While entry by force is the traditional method of enforcing
compliance with a warrant,55 this approach appears revelant only to
seizing evidence of a crime which may be disposed of or secreted if
entry is delayed. In the case of housing violations, these can be hidden
from the inspector only by the desired remedial action, so that delay,
except in the case of emergencies, does not ordinarily frustrate the
public interest.
When entry under a search warrant is refused, the court could
punish such refusal. In addition, the provisions in most housing codes
penalizing a refusal to comply with or resistance to the execution of
the provisions of the code, would probably be adequate to support a
penalty for refusal to comply with a lawful search warrant issued to
implement the inspection provisions.
H. Consent to Warrantless Search as Condition of License
The Court's recognition of "such accepted regulatory techniques
as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a
business or marketing a product" 56 raises the question of whether a
license may, as a condition of its issuance, require consent to warrant-
less inspections after such issuance. Such a proposal raises the ques-
tion of unconstitutional conditions. Unlike Zap v. United States,57
where the petitioner, in order to obtain the Government's business,
specifically agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and records
and the Court found a voluntary waiver of his claim to the privacy of
such records, the licensee under this proposal would have to waive
his constitutional protection under the fourth and fifth amendments
53 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
54 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
55 Crimes & Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
56 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
57328 U.S. 624 (1945).
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as a condition to engaging in business with anyone.5" The dilemma
that would confront the individual is the choice between losing the
benefit or privilege which the license would confer and the hazard
of waiving his constitutional rights in advance, not knowing when
or how they may be violated by the law enforcement agency. It could
reasonably be argued that the threat of withholding the license would
constitute duress vitiating the consent.59 Moreover, it is doubtful that
a case could now be made for the proposition that the alternative
means of a search warrant which is not subversive of constitutional
rights is inadequate to protect the public welfare.6"
CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Supreme Court in Camara and See are a
challenge to the inventiveness of administrators and lawyers to demon-
strate that social programs intended to protect the public health and
welfare can be developed and operated efficiently without invading
private rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The cases should not
be interpreted as requiring slavish adherence to the broad guidelines
indicated by the Court, but rather as giving room for a variety of
approaches to the problem which can be developed to meet the con-
stitutional requirements. It would be unrealistic to assume that these
decisions have settled the problems of regulatory inspections, or that
further litigation of these issues should not be anticipated. An under-
standing of the thrust of the constitutional guaranties involved,
and of the limitations on official actions spelled out in cases imple-
menting these guaranties, however, is an essential ingredient of the
development of legislation and programs capable of withstanding
these challenges.
In dealing with problems such as these, where community and
individual interests seem to conflict, we must bear in mind the state-
ment of the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio:
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its
own existence. As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example.... If the Government becomes a
58 This goes far beyond the requirement that a business maintain records which are to be
made available for public inspection. Such records have been held to assume the
characteristics of quasi-public documents and their disclosure may be compelled with-
out violating the fourth amendment. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950) ; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
59 In People v. Younger, 327 Mich. 410, 42 N.W.2d 120 (1950), the court held that a
person accepting a license to hunt could not be required as a condition of such license
to waive his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, even though
the search would be directed only against game taken by the licensed hunter.
60 Cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." 
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APPENDIX
I. PERTINENT STATUTORY INSPECTION PROVISIONS
A. Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1270 '(1964).
§ 1270. Examinations and Investigations
(a) Authority to conduct.
The Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations, inspections,
and investigations for the purposes of this chapter through officers
and employees of the Department or through any health officer or
employee of any State, territory, or political subdivision thereof,
duly commissioned by the Secretary as an officer of the Department.
(b) Inspection; notice; samples.
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or em-
ployees duly designated by the Secretary, upon presenting appro-
priate credentials and a written notice to the owner, operator, or
agent in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any
factory, warehouse, or establishment in which hazardous substances
are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for introduction into
interstate commerce or are held after such introduction, or to enter
any vehicle being used to transport or hold such hazardous substances
in interstate commerce; (2) to inspect, at reasonable times and
within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such factory,
warehouse, establishment, or vehicle, and all pertinent equipment,
finished and unfinished materials, and labeling therein; and (3) to
obtain samples of such materials or packages thereof, or of such
labeling. A separate notice shall be given for each such inspection,
but a notice shall not be required for each entry made during the
period covered by the inspection. Each such inspection shall be
commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
B. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1964).
§ 374. Inspection
(a) Right of agents to enter; scope of inspection; notice; prompt-
ness; exclusions.
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or em-
ployees duly designated by the Secretary, upon presenting appropri-
ate credentials and a written notice to the owner, operator, or agent
in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any
factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices,
or cosmetics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for intro-
duction into interstate commerce or after such introduction, or to
enter any vehicle being used to transport or hold such food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics in interstate commerce; and (2) to inspect, at
reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner, such factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all
pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials; containers,
and labeling therein. In the case of any factory, warehouse, estab-
lishment, or consulting laboratory in which prescription drugs are
manufactured, processed, packed, or held, the inspection shall extend
to all things therein (including records, files, papers, processes,
controls, and facilities) bearing on whether prescription drugs which
are adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this chapter,
or which may not be manufactured, introduced into interstate com-
61367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
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merce, or sold, or offered for sale by reason of any provision of this
chapter, have been or are being manufactured, processed, packed,
transported, or held in any such place, or otherwise bearing on viola-
tion of this chapter.
II. FORMS USED FOR INSPECTION WARRANTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
(Prescription Drugs)







To the United States District Judge: FOOD. DRUG, AND
United States District Court COSMETIC 
ACT.
District of
duly authorized inspector of the Food
and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
I hereby applies
for an inspection warrant, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 374, for the inspection of the
establishment identified as follows:
1. This establishment is engaged in the manufacture, processing, packing,
holding of prescription drugs which are to be or have been shipped in interstate
commerce.
2. It is a registered establishment under 21 U.S.C. 360, and is required to
be inspected at least once every two years.
3. The establishment has not previously been inspected.
was last inspected
4. This is a scheduled inspection undertaken as a part of a statutorily
authorized inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
5. The inspection will be conducted within regular business hours. Written
notice and the inspector's credentials will be supplied as prescribed in 21 U.S.C.
374. The inspection will begin as soon as practicable after the issuance of this
warrant and will be completed with reasonable promptness.
6. The inspection will extend to the establishment and all pertinent equip-
ment, finished and unfinished materials, containers, labeling, and all other things
therein (including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities)
bearing on whether prescription drugs are being produced in compliance with
the Act, whether products not in compliance have been processed, packed,
transported, or held, or whether conditions exist which otherwise bear upon
violation of the Act.
7. Samples will be collected when necessary to a reasonable inspection and
receipt will be given therefor.
8. The inspector may be accompanied by one or more inspectors, duly
authorized pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 2.121(b).
9. A return will be made to the Court at the completion of the inspection.
10. The authority for the issuance of the inspection warrant is 21 U.S.C. 374
and Camara v. Municipal Court, No. 92, and See v. Seattle, No. 180, decided
June 5, 1967 by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Sworn to and subscribed by
John Doe - 007
United States Food and Drug
Administration
Before me Clerk of the
United States District Court for the , District of
., on this day of
personally appeae , and upon oath stated that
the facts set forth in this application are true to his knowledge and belief.
Clerk, U.S. District Court
WARRANT FOR INSPECTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
To and any other authorized
United States Food and Drug Inspector:
Application having been made, and probable cause shown, by
, United States Food and Drug Inspector, for
an inspection of the establishment described as:
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, No. 92, and See v. Seattle,
No. 180, decided June 5, 1967, you are authorized to enter the above described
premises at reasonable times during ordinary business hours, and to inspect in
a reasonable manner and to a reasonable extent, including the collection of
samples if necessary, all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials,
containers, labeling, and all other things in the establishment (including records,
files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bearing upon whether prescrip-
tion drugs are being produced in compliance with any applicable provisions of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, whether products not in compliance
have been processed, packed, transported, or held, or whether conditions exist
which otherwise bear upon violation of the Act.





Inspection of the establishment described in this warrant was made on
John Doe - 007
Inspector, U.S. Food and Drug
Administration
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